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II.-100 
A TRAGEDY OF NOVELTY: IS FOR-CAUSE 
REMOVAL PROTECTION FOR THE 
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION 
BUREAU’S SINGLE DIRECTOR A FATAL 
FLAW? 
Abstract: On January 31, 2018, the en banc United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit held, in PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Pro-
tection Bureau, that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) was 
permissibly organized under the Supreme Court’s removal power jurisprudence. 
In doing so, the court found that the CFPB’s structure, which provided the agen-
cy’s single director for-cause removal protection, did not impinge on the Presi-
dent’s powers under Article II of the U.S. Constitution. Nonetheless, the fate of 
the CFPB remains in doubt. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit has agreed to hear an appeal in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. 
RD Legal Funding, after the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York found that the CFPB was unconstitutionally structured, adopting, in 
toto, sections I–IV of then-Judge Kavanaugh’s PHH Corp. dissent. This Com-
ment argues that then-Judge Kavanaugh’s dissenting opinion inappropriately 
supplants Congress’s judgment regarding the appropriate structure of the CFPB. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is among the most 
important and controversial reforms of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Financial Protection Act (“CFPA”) of 2010.1 As an independent 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV. BANK-
ING & FIN. L. 321, 322 (2013). Historically, consumer protection was a matter for state law. Id. at 323. 
Prior to the New Deal, states provided a limited range of protections, such as allowing citizens to 
enforce consumer protection rights through contract and tort law, capping interest rates through usury 
laws, and limiting the types of products offered by state-chartered financial institutions. Id. Federal 
involvement in consumer protection grew during the New Deal and World War II. Id. at 324–25. But, 
like past state involvement, it was primarily aimed at ensuring financial institutions’ solvency to pre-
vent bank failures, not protecting individual consumers. Id. The passage of the Consumer Credit Pro-
tection Act of 1968 began a period of predominate and, at times, exclusive and preemptive federal 
control of consumer financial protection. Id. at 327. Still, many believed this change failed to ade-
quately protect consumers because enforcement responsibility was spread among at least twelve dif-
ferent federal agencies, where pursuing other agency directives took priority over consumer protec-
tion. Id. at 327–28. Furthermore, state laws were frequently preempted by weaker federal protections 
aimed at increasing banks’ profitability and the number of financial instruments available to consum-
ers. Id. at 328–29. A central theme in the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(“CFPB”) was to aggregate consumer protection in a single agency to assure that it would no longer 
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agency within the Federal Reserve, the CFPB governs nearly all consumer fi-
nancial services firms through its rulemaking, supervision, and enforcement 
authority.2 Because of the role consumer financial products played in bringing 
about the 2008 financial crisis, Congress tasked the CFPB with making con-
sumer credit products safer.3 
                                                                                                                           
be subordinate to other agency concerns, to improve regulatory expertise, and prevent arbitrage of a 
poorly integrated regulatory framework. Id. at 329–34. The Dodd-Frank Act also recognized the harm 
wrought by preemption, allowing states to enact stronger consumer protection laws and state regula-
tors and Attorneys General to enforce consumer protections laws and CFPB regulations. MICHAEL S. 
BARR ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 594 (2018); see 12 U.S.C. § 5551 (2012) 
(providing that state law which strengthen consumer protection regulations will not be preempted); id. 
§ 5552 (allowing state attorneys general and state regulators to bring civil actions). 
 2 Levitin, supra note 1, at 322. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 5512(a) (governing the CFPB’s rule-
making authority); id. §§ 5514–5515 (governing the CFPB’s supervision authority); id. § 5564(a) 
(governing the CFPB’s ability to bring a civil action for violations of Federal consumer financial law). 
The distinction between an executive agency and an independent agency within the executive branch 
has historically hinged on the agency leadership’s accountability to the president: an independent 
agency’s leadership can only be removed “for cause,” while the leadership of an executive agency can 
be removed by the president “at will.” See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture 
Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 16, 42 (2010) (noting that for-cause removal is a 
touchstone of agency independence). Independent agencies are intended to allow regulatory experts 
latitude to solve complex problems by insulating them from party politics, such that they can act im-
partially and in the long-term interest of the public. Id. at 19–21; see Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. 
Piles, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2376–77 (2006) (indicating that 
independent regulatory commissions of the late nineteenth century emerged as a way to limit the in-
fluence of partisan political power). 
 3 Levitin, supra note 1, at 334–35. In the years before the financial crisis, advocates of consumer 
financial protection decried the state of consumer credit product regulation in the United States. See 
Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3–7 (2008) (emphasiz-
ing that the United States ought to regulate potentially harmful financial products just as it regulates 
potentially harmful physical products); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three 
Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1317–21 (2002) 
(calling for government intervention to disincentivize predatory home-mortgage lending). This weak 
regulation, coupled with the ability to securitize and sell home mortgages to investors, led to a mas-
sive expansion in subprime lending in the early 2000s, dramatically increasing the number of loans 
made to risky borrowers with poor credit scores, significant debt, and “difficult-to-document income.” 
BARR ET AL., supra note 1, at 59–60; see FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN-
QUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 70 (2011) (highlighting that in 2006 subprime mort-
gages totaled $600 billion and represented 23.5 percent of mortgages originated). Lenders frequently 
exploited borrowers, luring them in with minimal down payment requirements and low initial monthly 
payments while disguising—through complex and misleading terms—exorbitant fees, high interest 
rates, and prepayment penalties that commenced after the initial “teaser” period. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY 
COMM’N, supra, at 78, 104–05. In addition to these exploitive practices, lenders often undertook 
fraudulent practices such as forging signatures and falsifying income appraisals. Id. In spite of the 
higher risk of delinquency and default, lenders continued to make the loans, which could be securit-
ized, pooled with other loans, and sold to investors with high credit ratings. Id. at 73, 127–29. The 
2008 Financial Crisis began as home prices fell, which prevented homeowners from refinancing their 
home mortgages, leading to defaults. Id. at 213–21. As a result, credit rating agencies reduced the 
rating mortgage-backed securities to reflect the increased likelihood of default, significantly eroding 
the value of the pooled loans to financial firms holding these assets. Id. at 226–27. 
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In PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“PHH Corp. 
II”), the en banc Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit deter-
mined that the CFPB’s structure was constitutional.4 At issue in the case was 
whether it was permissible for the CFPB to be headed by a single director who 
could only be removed by the President for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance in office.”5 The court’s decision reversed a three-judge D.C. Cir-
cuit panel ruling that held that the CFPB lacked the authority to bring a civil 
action because the for-cause removal provision impinged on the separation of 
powers and the President’s Article II removal power.6 
Despite the D.C. Circuit’s rejection of PHH’s constitutional claim, the ar-
gument reemerged in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. RD Legal 
Funding, LLC.7 In that case, the United States District Court for the Southern 
                                                                                                                           
 4 PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (PHH Corp. II), 881 F.3d 75, 110 (D.C. Cir. 2018) 
(en banc) (determining that the structure of the CFPB is constitutionally sound because Supreme 
Court precedent upholding for-cause protections of independent agencies is binding). 
 5 Id. at 81; see 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c) (2012) (providing the CFPB director a five-year term and for-
cause removal protection). 
 6 PHH Corp. II, 881 F.3d at 110; see also PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (PHH Corp. 
I), 839 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (determining that CFPB was unconstitutionally structured because 
single-headed agencies are unsupported by historical precedent, diminish the authority of the presi-
dent, and threaten liberty). Concerns about the structure of the CFPB are hardly new. Levitin, supra 
note 1, at 337–38. Opponents of the CFPB have expressed concern about the agency’s highly inde-
pendent design and scope of power since its inception. Id.; see BARR ET AL., supra note 1, at 580 
(noting opposition from the banking industry). In particular, the use of a unitary directorship, instead 
of a bipartisan committee structure, led many opponents to fear that the profitability of the financial 
services industry would be reduced because the CFPB was not politically accountable and had exten-
sive regulatory powers. Levitin, supra note 1, at 337–38. In contrast, proponents of the agency felt 
that the CFPB needed to be highly independent to avoid industry capture and “heavy-handed political 
interference by Congress and the White House.” Id. at 339. This concern was particularly acute given 
the strength of the financial services lobby and the danger that a president with influence over the 
CFPB director could attempt to jump-start the economy by demanding lending rules be relaxed, leav-
ing the next administration to deal with the aftermath. See Brief of Amici Curiae Consumer Fin. 
Regulation Scholars in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant at 8–9, English v. Trump, No. 18-5007 (D.C. 
Cir. July 13, 2018) (highlighting the importance of agency independence to CFPB). Industry capture 
occurs when agency decisions unduly favor the industry it is attempting to regulate. See Barkow, 
supra note 2, at 21 n.23 (defining capture as the extent to which the agency is responsive to the indus-
try regulated). This dynamic frequently occurs when agencies attempt to regulate well-financed, com-
plex, and politically-connected industries where agency officials often return to the industry for em-
ployment following their tenure in government. Id. at 22–23. For-cause removal protection is intended 
to both insulate agency heads from partisan political pressure and reduce industry capture by allowing 
agency officials long-term job stability and the latitude to oppose a president influenced by industry 
groups. Id. at 28–30. Although a unitary directorship allows for quick and decisive regulatory action, 
scholars believe that multi-membered commissions of mixed political affiliations are better positioned 
to avoid industry capture because they are more likely to generate dissent. Id. at 37–41. 
 7 See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. RD Legal Funding, LLC, 332 F. Supp. 3d 729, 784 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (disagreeing with the en banc holding of the D.C. Circuit in PHH Corp. II and in-
stead adopting Sections I–IV of then-Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent regarding the constitutionality of the 
agency and Section II of Judge Henderson’s dissent regarding the severability of the removal provi-
sion, therefore invalidating the CFPB in its entirety). Since dissenting in PHH Corp. II, Brett Ka-
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District of New York determined that the CFPB was unconstitutionally struc-
tured and that the removal provision was not severable, thus invalidating the 
CFPB in its entirety.8 The Second Circuit has accepted the CFPB’s appeal of 
that decision.9 Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has agreed 
to hear an interlocutory appeal in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. All 
American Check Cashing, Inc. raising the same constitutional question in re-
sponse to a CFPB complaint filed in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Mississippi.10 
The looming possibility of a circuit split between the Second, Fifth, and 
D.C. Circuits places the future of the CFPB in doubt and may, more broadly, 
circumscribe Congress’s ability to structure independent administrative agen-
cies.11 The elimination of the for-cause removal provision or whole-sale inval-
idation of the CFPB would have profound effects on the enforcement of the 
consumer protection laws and fundamentally alter Congress’s vision for the 
post-financial crisis financial services industry.12 
Part I of this Comment examines the factual and procedural backgrounds 
of PHH Corp., RD Legal Funding, and All American Check Cashing.13 Part II 
                                                                                                                           
vanaugh was elevated to the Supreme Court. This Comment refers to Justice Kavanaugh as “Judge 
Kavanaugh” to make clear it is discussing his dissent in PHH Corp. II during his time as a Circuit 
Judge. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Docketing Notice, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. RD Legal Funding, LLC, No. 18-2860 (2d 
Cir. Sept. 28, 2018). 
 10 Order Granting Interlocutory Appeal in Part, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. All Am. Check 
Cashing, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-00356 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 27, 2018) (granting interlocutory appeal on ques-
tion of whether the CFPB is constitutionally structured). The prospect of a circuit split between the 
Fifth Circuit and D.C. Circuit is particularly high given that the Fifth Circuit recently determined that 
the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) was unconstitutionally structured. Collins v. 
Mnuchin, 896 F.3d 640, 646 (5th Cir.), reh’g granted, 908 F.3d 151 (5th Cir. 2018). The FHFA is an 
independent agency formed by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, which is similarly 
independent of congressional appropriations and led by a single director with for-cause removal pro-
tections. Id. at 645, 649; see 12 U.S.C. § 4512(a) (2012) (establishing a single director of the agency); 
id. § 4512(b)(2) (providing for-cause removal protection); id. § 4516 (governing the agency’s funding 
structure). The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning closely tracked Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent in PHH Corp. II. 
See Collins, 896 F.3d at 659–60, 668 (highlighting that independent agencies play a significant role in 
American life and the long history of independent agencies headed by multi-member commissions). 
Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit’s opinion noted some features that distinguish the CFPB and the FHFA. 
Id. at 673. Specifically, the CFPB has an additional oversight feature, the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council, which makes the CFPB accountable to the President, while the FHFA has no formal over-
sight. Id. 
 11 Compare PHH Corp. II, 881 F.3d at 77 (determining that a single-headed agency with for-
cause removal was constitutionally sound so long as the agency required that level of independence), 
with RD Legal Funding, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 784 (determining that a single-headed agency with for-
cause removal protection is unconstitutional). 
 12 See Levitin, supra note 1, at 322–29 (highlighting the poor state of consumer protection prior 
to the enactment of the CFPB due to federal preemption and the dispersion of enforcement authority 
among numerous branches). 
 13 See infra notes 16–43 and accompanying text. 
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discusses the development of the removal power doctrine and the application 
of the doctrine by the majority and dissents in PHH Corp. II.14 Finally, Part III 
argues that the dissenters in PHH Corp. II inappropriately supplanted Con-
gress’s judgment regarding the appropriate measure of agency independence.15 
I. THE EMERGENCE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 
This Part discusses the facts and procedural history of three cases chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the CFPB.16 Section A illustrates how PHH 
Corp. II arrived before the en banc D.C. Circuit.17 Section B details the actions 
taken by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
in RD Legal Funding, which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has since 
agreed to hear on appeal.18 Section C provides a brief description of All Ameri-
can Check Cashing, which is now before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on 
an interlocutory appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Mississippi.19 
A. PHH Corp.’s Procedural History 
On January 29, 2014, the CFPB brought a Notice of Charges against a 
large mortgage lender, PHH Corporation, and its captive reinsurer, Atrium, for 
violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”).20 The 
CFPB alleged that PHH and its affiliates had been operating an illegal insur-
                                                                                                                           
 14 See infra notes 44–94 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 96–112 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 20–43 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 20–29 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 34–39 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
 20 Notice of Charges at 1, 17–18, PHH Corp., No. 2014-CFPB-0002 (Jan. 29, 2014) (alleging that 
the premiums paid by mortgage insurance companies to PHH were kickbacks and were either not for 
the services performed or that they grossly exceeded the value of any service performed). The CFPB’s 
enforcement authority extends to violations of “[f]ederal consumer financial law,” which includes 
provisions of the Consumer Financial Protection Act (“CFPA”) and “enumerated consumer laws” 
found in 12 U.S.C. § 5481(12). See generally 12 U.S.C. § 5516(b)–(d) (2012) (governing the CFPB’s 
ability to require reports, perform regulating examination, and enforce Federal consumer financial 
protection law); id. § 5481(12) (defining the enumerated consumer financial laws); id. § 5481(14) 
(defining “[f]ederal consumer financial law”). The CFPB may initiate an administrative adjudication 
proceeding by filing a Notice of Charges that alleges a violation of a consumer protection law as they 
did in PHH Corp., or they may initiate a civil suit by bringing an action in federal district court. 12 
U.S.C. §§ 5563, 5564; see Notice of Charges, supra, at 17–18 (initiating an administrative adjudica-
tion procedure against PHH); Levitin, supra note 1, at 357–58 (detailing parties CFPB may bring an 
enforcement action against). Administrative proceedings occur before an agency tribunal overseen by 
an administrative law judge pursuant to their authority under the Administrative Procedure Act. Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq. (2012); Administrative Adjudication Proceedings, 
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU https://www.consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-
proceedings/ [https://perma.cc/PM9A-2ZKW]. 
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ance kickback program since at least 1995.21 A Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) administrative law judge found PHH in violation of RES-
PA and recommended that the Director disgorge the company of $6.4 million 
in profits.22 Rather than pay the fine, PHH appealed the decision to then-CFPB 
Director Richard Cordray, who determined that the administrative law judge’s 
findings were too narrow and increased the disgorgement to $109 million.23 
PHH appealed the Director’s ruling to the D.C. Circuit, where a three-judge 
panel unanimously vacated the Director’s decision in PHH Corp. v. Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (“PHH Corp. I”).24 The court further considered 
whether the for-cause removal provision of the CFPA unconstitutionally treads 
on the separation of powers.25 A two-judge majority determined that the 
CFPB’s structure was unconstitutional and severed the removal provision, 
making the director removable by President at will.26 The CFPB successfully 
petitioned the D.C. Circuit to rehear the case en banc.27 A divided court ulti-
mately found that § 5491(c), which provides the Director of the CFPB a five-
year term and allows removable by the President only for “inefficiency, neglect 
of duty, or malfeasance in office,” was constitutionally permissible.28 The 
Court reinstated the panel’s statutory holding that the Director’s decision ex-
                                                                                                                           
 21 CFPB Takes Action Against PHH Corporation for Mortgage Insurance Kickbacks, CONSUMER 
FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Jan 29, 2014) [hereinafter CFPB Takes Action], https://www.consumerfinance.gov/
about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-against-phh-corporation-for-mortgage-insurance-kickbacks/ 
[https://perma.cc/G8EN-MF4U]. When a borrower cannot make a 20% down payment on the value of 
the home they are often required to purchase mortgage insurance to protect lenders from the elevated 
risk of default. Id. This, however, adds an additional cost for borrowers who must pay for the insur-
ance as part of their monthly payments. Id. Because lenders, not borrowers, select the insurer, there 
are often opportunities for kickbacks that hurt consumers. Id. The Real Estate Settlement Procedures 
Act (“RESPA”)—a federal consumer financial law that the CFPB may enforce per 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5481(12)—bans kickbacks that “unnecessarily increase the cost of mortgage settlement services.” 
Id.; see 12 U.S.C § 2607 (2012) (governing the prohibition against kickbacks and unearned fees in 
real estate settlement services). The CFPB investigation found that PHH referred consumers to certain 
partner mortgage insurers who purchased “reinsurance” from PHH subsidiaries with PHH taking fees 
as kickbacks. CFPB Takes Action, supra. 
 22 PHH Corp. II, 881 F.3d at 82 (citing Director’s Decision at 11, 22, PHH Corp., No. 2014-
CFPB-0002 (June 4, 2014)). 
 23 Id. at 82–83 (disagreeing with Director Cordray’s broad interpretation of RESPA, which held 
that payments were not permissible unless they were in no way connected to a referral business and 
that “RESPA’s three-year statute of limitations does not apply to the agency’s administrative en-
forcement proceedings”). 
 24 PHH Corp. I, 839 F.3d at 10. 
 25 Id. at 7, 15; see 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (providing that “the President may remove the director 
for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office”). 
 26 PHH Corp. I, 839 F.3d at 8 (holding that the CFPB is unconstitutionally structured and that the 
removal provision should be severed to make the director removable at-will by the President). 
 27 Clerk’s Order at 1, PHH Corp. II, 881 F.3d 75 (No. 15-1157). 
 28 PHH Corp. II, 881 F.3d at 77, 81; see 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c) (providing the CFPB director a five-
year term and for-cause removal protection). 
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ceeded REPSA’s scope and remanded to the CFPB, who dismissed the case.29 
PHH declined to appeal the constitutional question to the Supreme Court.30 
Nonetheless, an appeal to the Supreme Court was filed in State National 
Bank of Big Spring v. Mnuchin, a case that similarly challenged the constitu-
tionality of the CFPB’s structure, but was held in abeyance by the District 
Court while awaiting the outcome of PHH Corp.31 After the PHH Corp. II de-
cision, the district court entered judgment against State National Bank of Big 
Spring, which the D.C. Circuit Court summarily affirmed.32 The Supreme 
Court, however, denied State National Bank of Big Spring’s petition for writ of 
certiorari on January 14, 2019.33 
B. RD Legal Funding’s Procedural History 
In Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. RD Legal Funding, LLC the 
CFPB brought an action against RD Legal Funding in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York.34 The government alleged 
that RD Legal Funding engaged in abusive loan practices against 9/11 first re-
sponders and former National Football League players suffering from brain 
injuries in violation of five sections of the CFPA.35 In response, RD Legal 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See PHH Corp. II, 881 F.3d at 83 (determining that captive reinsurance arrangements were 
permissible so long as reinsurance does not exceed market value and the three-year statute of limita-
tions applies to the administrative proceeding meaning profits could not be disgorged dating back to 
the start of the program in 1995); Order Dismissing Notice of Charges at 1, PHH Corp., No. 2014-
CFPB-0002 (June 7, 2018) (indicating that the CFPB was dropping its charges against PHH for viola-
tions of RESPA). 
 30 Yuka Hyashi, PHH Decides Not to Appeal CFPB Case to Supreme Court, WALL STREET J., 
(May 3, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/phh-decides-not-to-appeal-cfpb-case-to-supreme-court-
1525369924 [https://perma.cc/TBT8-DYCH]. 
 31 State Nat’l Bank v. Lew, 197 F. Supp. 3d 177, 186 (D.D.C. 2016). An abeyance is a discretion-
ary procedure that the court may use to delay the proceedings pending the outcome of another case. 
See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Deciding When to Decide: How Appellate Procedure Distributes the 
Costs of Legal Change, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 219–20 (indicating that an abeyance is a technique 
courts use to conserve judicial resources where “a change in law appears to be in the offing”). 
 32 State Nat’l Bank v. Mnuchin, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 16266, at*4 (D.C. Cir. June 8, 2018), 
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 627 (2019). 
 33 State Nat’l Bank v. Mnuchin, 139 S. Ct. 627, 627 (2019). Notably, Justice Kavanaugh did not 
take part in the consideration of the petition. Id. 
 34 Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. RD Legal Funding, LLC, 332 F. Supp. 3d 729, 745–46 (S.D.N.Y. 
2018). RD Legal Funding offered cash advances to consumers awaiting settlement agreement and judg-
ment payouts after verdicts in their favor. Id. at 746. 
 35 Id. at 746–48. The 9/11 first responders were claimants under the James Zagroda 9/11 Health 
and Compensation Act of 2010. Complaint at 1–2, RD Legal Funding, 332 F. Supp. 3d 729 (No. 00-
890). The other group consisted of former National Football League players diagnosed with neuro-
degenerative diseases such as chronic traumatic encephalopathy, Alzheimer’s, or Parkinson’s disease. 
Id. at 6. Specifically, the CFPB alleged that RD Legal Funding and other defendants engaged in abu-
sive and “deceptive . . . practices . . . by misrepresenting that the [p]urchase [a]greements constituted 
valid and enforceable assignments” and that “they could ‘cut through red tape’ and expedite a Con-
sumer’s award payment when in fact they could not,” delivered late payments though they represented 
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Funding argued that the CFPB’s structure was unconstitutional and it therefore 
lacked the authority to bring the claims.36 The United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York determined that the CFPB was unconstitu-
tionally structured.37 The court adopted, in toto, Sections I–IV of D.C. Circuit 
Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent in PHH Corp. II regarding the CFPB’s structure.38 
Adopting, in toto, Section II of Judge Henderson’s PHH Corp. II dissent, the 
court further decided that the for-cause removal provision was not severable 
and that Title X—which created the CFPB—should be stricken in its entirety.39 
The CFPB has since appealed the Southern District of New York’s decision.40  
C. All American Check Cashing’s Procedural History 
On May 11, 2016 the CFPB brought actions against pay-day lenders All 
American Check Cashing, Inc., Mid-State Finance, Inc., and Michael E. Gray 
for violations of the CFPA in the District Court for the Southern District of 
Mississippi.41 On April 24, 2018 the court certified the defendants’ interlocuto-
                                                                                                                           
otherwise, and collected usurious interest rates under state law. RD Legal Funding, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 
748. The Dodd-Frank Act expanded consumer protection, which previously extended to acts that were 
unfair or deceptive, to include abusive practices. BARR ET AL., supra note 1, at 586. Instead of further 
defining “abusive practices” through rulemaking, the CFPB released guidance on practices that are 
considered “abusive,” but noted that the guidance was not exhaustive. Id. at 587. Controversially, the 
CFPB pushed for a more expansive conception of the term through administrative and judicial en-
forcement actions. Id.; see Jeffrey P. Naiman & Kirk D. Jensen, The UDAP-ification of Consumer 
Financial Services Law, 128 BANKING L.J. 22, 32 (2011) (highlighting the challenge faced by indus-
try groups if agencies and courts apply a more expansive interpretation to conduct thought fair at the 
time of the transaction). 
 36 RD Legal Funding, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 745–46. 
 37 Id. at 784. 
 38 Id. (citing PHH Corp. II, 881 F.3d at 166–67 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (concluding that the 
CFPB is unconstitutionally structured because a unitary directorship of an independent agency—one 
that only provides for “for cause removal”—is historically unprecedented, places enormous un-
checked power in the hands of one individual, and impermissibly reduces the President’s authority to 
control his own branch)). 
 39 Id. (citing PHH Corp. II, 881 F.3d at 163–64 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (determining that the 
CFPB’s independence was essential to the statute, thus Title X should be stricken entirely)). 
 40 Notice of Civil Appeal, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. RD Legal Funding, LLC, No. 18-3156 
(2d Cir. Oct. 23, 2018). 
 41 Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 1, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. All 
Am. Check Cashing, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-00356 (S.D. Miss. 2016). Specifically, the Bureau brought 
claims for violations of Sections 1031(a), 1036(a) and 1054(a) of the CFPA. Id. The CFPB alleged 
that the defendants made deceptive statements about fees, misrepresented the difference in costs be-
tween loans programs to push consumers into disadvantageous programs, pressured consumers into a 
monthly lending model, and violated Mississippi law regarding rollover loans, meaning subsequent 
loans were provided to pay off prior loans. Id. at 17–22; see CFPB Takes Action Against Check Cash-
ing and Payday Lending Company for Tricking and Trapping Consumers, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. 
BUREAU (May 11, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-
against-check-cashing-and-payday-lending-company-tricking-and-trapping-consumers/ [https://
perma.cc/4VMA-VP62] (detailing the CFPB’s enforcement action against All American Check Cash-
ing). 
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ry appeal to the Fifth Circuit on the question of whether the structure of the 
CFPB violates the Constitution’s separation of powers.42 The Fifth Circuit ac-
cepted the appeal and has docketed the case for oral argument on March 12, 
2019.43 
II. THE REMOVAL POWER: HISTORY AND APPLICATION 
 The Supreme Court has rarely addressed the scope of the President’s re-
moval power.44 Nonetheless, debate regarding the removal power is conten-
tious and dates back to the First Congress and the Decision of 1789.45 This Part 
examines the limited array of cases that make up the Court’s jurisprudence on 
the issue, and how the PHH Corp. II majority and dissents came to vastly dif-
ferent conclusions regarding the permissibility of the CFPB’s removal re-
striction.46 Section A of this Part describes the foundational law underlying the 
                                                                                                                           
 42 Order Granting Interlocutory Appeal in Part, supra note 10. An interlocutory appeal is an im-
mediate appeal to the relevant Court of Appeals that a district judge may grant if it will hasten the 
ultimate termination of litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2012). The Court of Appeals may permit the 
order at its discretion. Id. 
 43 Case Calendared, All Am. Check Cashing, Inc., No. 18-90015 (5th Cir. Jan. 25, 2019); Motion 
for Leave to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order, Appeal in Part, All Am. Check Cashing, Inc., No. 
18-90015 (5th Cir. Apr. 24, 2018). 
 44 See PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (PHH Corp. II), 881 F.3d 75, 79 (D.C. Cir. 
2018). The Court has addressed presidential removal just five times since 1926. Id. (first citing 
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1926); then citing Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 
349 (1958); then citing Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); then citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 
U.S. 654 (1988); and then citing Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 
477 (2010)) (addressing the five removal power cases in the Supreme Court precedent since Myers v. 
United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)). 
 45 See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–
1801, at 36–41 (1997) (highlighting the disparate views held by members of Congress regarding 
which branch possessed the removal power). The Decision of 1789 refers to the debate ignited by 
James Madison’s proposal that the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs be removable by 
the president elicited vigorous debate about the removal power in the First Congress. See Myers v. 
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 151 (1926) (quoting Senator Daniel Webster’s 1835 speech which refers 
to the removal debate as the “[D]ecision of 1789”). Some congressmen believed that the Senate, 
which was charged with appointing officers, had the power of removal or else the President could 
evade Senate authority by removing and replacing an officer during a recess. CURRIE, supra, at 37. An 
additional argument emerged that the President did not possess the removal power because it was not 
an enumerated power under Article II. Id. at 38. Two claims soon countered this assertion. Id. Some 
congressmen posited that the Necessary and Proper Clause empowered Congress to determine wheth-
er the President could remove an official. Id. Conversely, others argued that removal was an executive 
power “implicit in the enumerated powers of the President, because he could exercise none of them 
without subordinates subject to his supervision and control.” Id. at 39–40. An amendment that distin-
guished these two approaches was introduced in the House of Representatives in an effort to divide 
support for presidential removal, however, both approaches won majorities, with similar numerical 
support but from different coalitions. Id. at 40–41. In sum, Congress determined that the President 
could remove the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, yet “there was no consensus as to whether he got that 
authority from Congress or from the Constitution itself.” Id. at 41. 
 46 See infra notes 49–94 and accompanying text. 
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President’s removal power.47 Section B discusses the application of that law in 
PHH Corp. II.48 
A. Foundational Removal Power Law 
The power to remove federal officers is not explicitly codified in the Con-
stitution.49 The Supreme Court, however, has recognized a presidential power 
to remove executive branch officials as part of the Take Care Clause.50 The 
Take Care Clause dictates that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.”51 The Court has determined that, absent the power to su-
pervise executive branch members, the President could not carry out this pow-
er.52 Though it was not the first instance where the Court considered presiden-
tial removal power, Myers v. United States is the seminal case in the Court’s 
removal power jurisprudence.53 The case arose after President Wilson fired the 
Portland postmaster, violating a statutory provision that required Senate ap-
proval for such a termination.54 The postmaster sued for back-wages, which 
the Government defended by arguing that the President had a constitutional 
right to remove executive officers and that the statute’s Senate approval re-
quirement violated the President’s Article II powers.55 In a majority opinion 
                                                                                                                           
 47 See infra notes 49–67 and accompanying text. 
 48 See infra notes 68–94 and accompanying text. 
 49 PHH Corp. II, 881 F.3d at 84 (quoting Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 492) (“The Constitution 
makes no explicit provision for presidential removal of duly appointed officers, but the Supreme 
Court has long recognized that ‘the executive power include[s] a power to oversee executive officers 
through removal.’”). 
 50 Id. at 84–85; see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. There are, however, numerous interpretations of the 
Take Care Clause, many of which fail to see it as a grant of authority. See Jack Goldsmith & John F. 
Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1835, 1835–39 (2016) (critiquing the 
Court’s cursory evaluation of the meaning of the Take Care Clause); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. 
Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1994) (“That the framers 
constitutionalized a strongly unitary executive . . . is just a plain myth . . . . It ignores strong evidence 
that the framers imagined not a clear executive hierarchy with the President at the summit, but a large 
degree of congressional power to structure the administration as it thought proper.”). But see Steven 
G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 
541, 616–22 (1994) (arguing that at the Founding the Take Care Clause was understood as grant of 
power to the President to enforce the law). 
 51 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 52 See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 484 (“The President cannot ‘take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed’ if he cannot oversee the faithfulness of the officers who execute them.”). 
 53 Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 50, at 1839. See generally Myers, 272 U.S. 52 (considering 
the presidential removal power). The Court had first addressed the issue in 1903. See Shurtleff v. 
United States, 189 U.S. 311, 317 (1903) (holding that the President may exercise removal powers 
pursuant to the Take Care Clause and that “it would be a mistaken view to hold that the mere specifi-
cation in the statute of some causes for removal thereby excluded the right of the President to remove 
for any other reason which he, acting with a due sense of his official responsibility, should think suffi-
cient”). 
 54 Myers, 272 U.S. at 106–08. 
 55 Id. 
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authored by Chief Justice, and former President, Taft, the Court determined 
that the President had vast authority to remove executive branch officers.56 The 
Court principally reasoned that if the President could not remove an officer 
exercising executive power on his behalf, he would be unable to discharge his 
Take Care Clause duties.57 
Less than a decade after Myers, the Supreme Court narrowed the sweep-
ing grant of removal authority given to the President.58 In Humphrey’s Execu-
tor v. United States, the Court considered a restriction on the President’s ability 
to remove members of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).59 The Court 
looked to the nature of the power exercised and determined that because the 
FTC fulfilled a legislative and judicial function, which distinguished it from a 
postmaster’s purely executive function at issue in Myers, the restrictions on the 
removal power were constitutional.60 
The Supreme Court again revisited the removal power in Morrison v. Ol-
son, where it considered a provision of the 1978 Ethics in Government Act that 
only allowed the Independent Counsel to be removed by the Attorney General 
for good cause.61 The majority jettisoned Humphrey’s Executor’s consideration 
of the nature of the power exercised, and instead looked to whether the remov-
                                                                                                                           
 56 Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 50, at 1839. 
 57 Myers, 272 U.S. at 135. The decision, however, was not without detractors who thought that 
the Court’s interpretation of the Decision of 1789 was incorrect. Id. at 283–87 & nn.72–75 (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that the Decision of 1789 was inconclusive and did not advocate that the Pres-
ident had an uncontrollable power to remove inferior officers); see Edward S. Corwin, Tenure of Of-
fice and the Removal Power Under the Constitution, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 353, 360–79 (1927) (detail-
ing the inaccuracies of the Court’s parsing of the legislative history of the Decision of 1789 in Myers). 
 58 See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 626–27 (determining that the holding of Myers was narrow, 
and simply provided that the President could remove the postmaster general without the advice and 
consent of the Senate). 
 59 Id. at 618–19. The act provides that “[a]ny commissioner may be removed by the President for 
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012). 
 60 Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 627–28. Similarly, in Wiener v. United States, the Supreme 
Court determined that President Eisenhower did not have the ability to remove members of the War 
Claims Commission at-will because the commission was similar to the Federal Trade Commission, 
and thus the President had no inherent constitutional power to do so, nor had Congress specified that 
the President could remove members of the Commission. Wiener, 357 U.S. at 355–56. Additionally, 
in Bowsher v. Synar, the Court considered a removal provision which provided that the Comptroller 
General may not be removed by the President and was instead solely removable by a joint resolution 
of Congress or impeachment. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 720. The Court determined the provision was 
unconstitutional because “Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer 
charged with the execution of the laws . . . .” Id. at 726. 
 61 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 692. Section 596(1) of the 1978 Ethics in Government Act provided that: 
“An independent counsel appointed under this chapter may be removed from office, other than by 
impeachment and conviction, only by the personal action of the Attorney General and only for good 
cause, physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition that substantially impairs the 
performance of such independent counsel’s duties.” 28 U.S.C. § 596 (1994). The Act was not renewed 
by Congress and expired in 1999. See id. § 599 (2012) (governing the termination of the Independent 
Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994). 
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al restriction interfered with the President’s Article II duties.62 The Supreme 
Court upheld the restriction though the President was denied any direct remov-
al power, highlighting that for-cause removal provided the Attorney General 
sufficient authority to assure that the Independent Counsel was adequately per-
forming his or her duties.63 
Most recently, in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Over-
sight Board the Supreme Court considered a “two-tiered” for-cause removal 
protection.64 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act provided that members of the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board could only be removed for good cause 
by SEC Commissioners, who were also insulated from removal by good cause 
protection.65 In contrast with Morrison, where removal power was granted ex-
clusively to a member of the executive branch who was removable at-will, the 
President could not remove the SEC Commissioners at-will.66 The Supreme 
Court determined that the protection unconstitutionally encumbered the Presi-
dent’s ability to ensure the faithful execution of the law.67 
B. Application of the Doctrine in PHH Corp. and RD Legal Funding 
In PHH Corp. II, the majority employed the Supreme Court’s Morrison 
analysis to determine whether the CFPB’s removal restrictions, and structure 
more broadly, impeded the President’s ability to perform his constitutional du-
ty pursuant to the Take Care Clause.68 The court determined that the answer to 
this Constitutional question depended on whether for-cause removal provisions 
were permissible, and, if so, whether the CFPB required that degree of inde-
pendence to carry out its congressionally assigned mission.69 The majority held 
                                                                                                                           
 62 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689–90 (noting that the purpose of the Court’s removal power analysis is 
“not to define rigid categories of those officials who may or may not be removed at will by the Presi-
dent, but to ensure that Congress does not interfere with the President's exercise of the ‘executive 
power’ and his constitutionally appointed duty to ‘take Care that the laws be faithfully executed’”). 
 63 Id. at 692. 
 64 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 483–84. 
 65 Id. at 485–86; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(e)(6), 7217(d)(3) (2012) (providing that SEC Commis-
sioners may remove members for good cause). Nonetheless, although there is a general consensus that 
SEC Commissioners are removable only for-cause, the statute is silent on the matter. Free Enter. 
Fund, 561 U.S. at 545–48 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 66 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 495–96. 
 67 Id. at 484; see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (the President “shall take Care that the laws be faithfully 
executed . . . .”). 
 68 PHH Corp. II, 881 F.3d at 79 (citing Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691 n.30) (noting that a “good 
cause” removal standard “does not impermissibly burden the President’s Article II powers, where ‘a 
degree of independence from the Executive . . . is necessary to the proper functioning of the agency or 
official’”). 
 69 Id. at 78 (quoting Wiener, 357 U.S. at 353) (“To analyze the constitutionality of the CFPB’s 
independence, we ask two questions: First, is the means of independence permissible . . . ? Second, 
does ‘the nature of the function that Congress vested in’ the agency call for that means of independ-
ence?”). 
II.-112 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:E. Supp. 
that the CFPB’s structure, which included for-cause removal, budgetary inde-
pendence, and a unitary directorship, met both standards and was constitution-
ally permissible.70 Regarding the for-cause removal provisions, the court 
pointed to the fact that the language of the for-cause removal statute of the 
CFPB was identical to the FTC’s, which the Supreme Court had upheld in 
Humphrey’s Executor.71 Moreover, in assessing whether the CFPB required 
independence, the court emphasized the long history of financial regulators 
receiving similar independence.72 The majority similarly rejected PHH’s ar-
gument that the CFPB’s budgetary independence rendered it unconstitutional, 
emphasizing that in addition to the tradition of affording financial regulatory 
agencies exemptions from appropriations, the CFPB’s independent funding 
structure impacted congressional but not presidential power.73 The court con-
cluded the President’s execution of his Article II duties was not impinged by a 
single-headed independent agency any more than it would be by a multi-
member commission.74 In contrast, the court noted that a single director may 
be more accountable because responsibility for the enforcement of consumer 
protection laws was vested in one person, rather than being spread across a 
commission or multiple agencies.75 Finally, the court rejected PHH’s wider 
theories of unconstitutionality regarding the scope the CFPB’s power, its sup-
posedly “novel” structure, the lack of structural safeguards provided by a 
group-led agency, and that allowing for-cause protection of single-headed 
agencies would allow Congress to institute for-cause protection of cabinet of-
ficers.76 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Id. at 100–01; see 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2012) (providing the CFPB director a five-year term 
and for-cause removal protection); id. § 5497(a)(1) (providing the CFPB with independent funding). 
 71 PHH Corp. II, 881 F.3d at 93 (noting the long history of the constitutional permissibility of 
single-level for-cause removal protection). 
 72 Id. at 91–92, 94–95 (highlighting examples such as Comptroller of the Treasury, the Federal 
Reserve Board, Federal Trade Commission, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the SEC which received similar latitude.) 
 73 Id. at 95–96. Moreover, the Court found PHH’s argument that the combination of for-cause re-
moval and budgetary independence made the CFPB unconstitutional unavailing. Id. For-cause removal 
limits the President while budgetary independence serves as a restraint on Congress, which does not 
amplify the effect of the President’s removal constraint. Id. at 96. Notably, the CFPB’s budgetary inde-
pendence is not without limits. See 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(2) (2012) (capping the CFPB’s budget at 
twelve percent of the Federal Reserve System’s “total operating expenses”). 
 74 PHH Corp. II, 881 F.3d at 97–98. 
 75 Id. at 98 (“Before Congress established the Bureau, multiple agencies—most of them inde-
pendent—had jurisdiction over consumer financial protection, and that dispersion hampered executive 
ability to diagnose and respond to problems. The creation of the CFPB . . . enhanced public accounta-
bility and simplified the President’s ability to communicate policy preferences and detect failings.”). 
 76 Id. at 101. The court determined that the scope of the CFPB’s authority was not constitutionally 
relevant because the Supreme Court’s analysis never centered on the number of laws the agency was 
tasked with implementing, but even if scope of power were constitutionally relevant, the CFPB’s power 
would certainly be less than the independent counsel’s in Morrison, who could charge any federal crimi-
nal law. Id. at 102–03. The majority additionally rebuffed PHH’s argument that the CFPB’s structure was 
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The PHH Corp. II dissenters fundamentally disagreed about the nature of 
the Court’s case law and instead argued that independent agencies are at odds 
with the Constitution’s three-branch set-up and decisions blessing their exist-
ence are merely limited accommodations.77 Sections I–IV of Judge Ka-
vanaugh’s dissent, which the District Court for the Southern District of New 
York adopted in RD Legal Funding, rejected the majority’s use of Humphrey’s 
Executor and Morrison as the constitutional guide in the case.78 Judge Ka-
vanaugh found the Morrison test inapplicable because the independent counsel 
                                                                                                                           
novel, and that this novelty rendered it unconstitutional because the CFPB is not historically anomalous, 
exemplified by single-headed financial regulators such as the Comptroller of the Treasury, the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, the Social Security Administration, and the Office of the Independent 
Counsel. Id. Moreover, novelty alone does not automatically make a feature unconstitutional according to 
the court. Id. at 105. The court additionally rejected PHH’s assertion that the CFPB unconstitutionally 
imperils liberty. Id. First, separation of powers serves a number of functions beyond preserving liberty 
and singling out one of those objectives could lead to any number of conclusions. Id. (quoting John F. 
Manning, Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 56–57 (2014)) 
(“[T]he purposes of separation of powers are too general and diverse to offer much concrete guidance. 
Among other things, the separation of powers . . . promote efficiency, energy, stability, limited gov-
ernment, control of factions, deliberation, the rule of law, and accountability.”). Secondly, while the 
CFPB may, as PHH argues, threaten financial services providers’ liberty, it preserves the liberty of con-
sumers by guarding against fraud and coercion, which impair freedom of contract, an essential market-
place liberty. Id. at 106. Third, a free-standing liberty analysis finds no home in the Supreme Court’s 
separation of powers precedent. Id. On this point, the majority noted additional provisions beyond for-
cause removal, which prevent the CFPB director from transgressing statutory and constitutional 
boundaries including the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) ability to intervene to pro-
tect markets, judicial review of disgorgement penalties, and congressional reporting requirements. Id.; 
see 12 U.S.C. § 5513 (2012) (governing the ability of the FSOC to invalidate a CFPB action if it 
“would put the safety and soundness of the United States banking system or the stability of the finan-
cial system of the United States at risk”); id. § 5563(b)(4) (providing that administrative adjudications 
may be reviewed by United States Courts of Appeals); id. § 5496(a) (requiring appearances before 
Congress); id. § 5496(b) (requiring semi-annual reports to Congress). Finally, the majority rejected 
PHH’s slippery-slope argument that Congress could then institute for-cause removal protection for cabi-
net level officers because the permissibility of a removal provision depends on the function performed by 
the agency, cabinet officers would undoubtedly be excluded from for-cause protection as they aid the 
President in carrying out essential constitutional duties. PHH Corp. II, 881 F.3d at 106. Moreover, cabi-
net-level officers and the heads of independent agencies operate on separate constitutional planes. Id. at 
107 (suggesting that the directors of independent agencies are not considered “principal officers of the 
executive departments” who could vote to remove the President under the Twenty-fifth Amendment 
and that the President would rightfully be able to remove “principal officer of the executive depart-
ments” at-will). 
 77 PHH Corp. II, 881 F.3d at 140 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting FTC v. Rubervoid Co., 343 
U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting)) (“[A]dministrative bodies have become a veritable 
fourth branch of Government, which has deranged our three-branch legal theories . . . .”); id. at 164 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (noting that Myers recognized the President’s ability to remove members 
of the Executive Branch while Humphrey’s Executor provided an exception to that rule). 
 78 PHH Corp. II, 881 F.3d at 193–95; Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. RD Legal Funding, LLC, 
729 F. Supp. 3d 729, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
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was unlike the director of an independent agency.79 Moreover, the issue of 
whether the independent counsel was unconstitutional because of its single-
headed-structure was never brought before the Court, rendering it non-
binding.80 Similarly, Judge Kavanaugh noted that Humphrey’s Executor did not 
control because it validated a multi-member commission.81 In Judge Ka-
vanaugh’s view, even the most charitable reading of the case left the constitu-
tional question concerning the CFPB’s unitary directorship unanswered.82 Ra-
ther, in determining whether the CFPB violated Article II, Judge Kavanaugh 
looked to the agency’s consistency with historical practice, the danger it posed 
to individual liberty, and the extent to which it reduced the President’s authori-
ty.83 
Judge Kavanaugh argued that Supreme Court precedent in separation of 
powers cases where the constitutional text did not control requires a strong 
consideration of the entity’s historical precedent.84 Accordingly, a lack of his-
torical precedent indicates that an entity is constitutional suspect.85 Finding 
that the CFPB lacked historical precedent, Judge Kavanaugh distinguished the 
CFPB from other independent agencies with single directors based on the 
CFPB’s more extensive powers and highlighted that those other agencies were 
recently created and constitutionally disputed.86 Additionally, Judge Ka-
                                                                                                                           
 79 PHH Corp. II, 881 F.3d at 195 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (noting that the independent counsel 
had “a narrowly defined jurisdiction in cases where the Department of Justice had a conflict of inter-
est,” possessed solely enforcement authority, and was an inferior—rather than principal—officer). 
 80 Id. (citing BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 46, 84, 226–28 
(2016)) (“[I]t is black-letter law that cases are not precedent for issues that were not raised or decided 
. . . it is impossible to rely on the result in Morrison as binding precedent on the single-Director ques-
tion.”). 
 81 Id. at 193–94. 
 82 Id. at 194 (“At best for the CFPB, Humphrey’s Executor leaves open the single-Director ques-
tion. Humphrey’s Executor does not hold that single Director independent agencies are constitution-
al.”). Judge Kavanaugh’s expansive vision of executive power is apparent in his discussion of 
Humphrey’s Executor. See id. at 195–96 n.18. He highlights criticism of Humphrey’s Executor and 
notes that, while the Court of Appeals is bound to adhere to Supreme Court precedent, overruling the 
case “would not mean the end of agencies that are now independent. The agencies would instead 
transform into executive agencies supervised and directed by the President.” Id. 
 83 Id. at 166–67. 
 84 Id. at 179–81. In a footnote, Judge Kavanaugh suggested that independent agencies, as a whole, 
are constitutionally unsound. Id. at 179 n.7. He stated, “As a matter of first principles, there would be 
a strong argument that this case could and should be resolved in PHH’s favor by the constitutional text 
alone—on the ground that independent agencies violate Article II. But Humphrey’s Executor rejected 
that broad argument, and we as a lower court are bound by that case.” Id. 
 85 Id. at 183 (quoting Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 505) (“‘Perhaps the most telling indication of 
the severe constitutional problem’ with the CFPB ‘is the lack of historical precedent for this entity.’”). 
 86 Id. at 174. Specifically, Judge Kavanaugh argued that the Social Security Administration—
altered by Congress in 1994 from a multi-member independent agency to an agency headed by a sin-
gle-director—did not serve as precedent because the agency’s structure was contested on constitution-
al grounds in a signing statement by then President Bill Clinton. Id. (citing President William J. Clin-
ton, Statement on Signing the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, 
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vanaugh argued that multi-member commissions reflect the constitutional 
principle of divided power, which, in contrast with the concentrated power of 
single-headed agencies, promotes thoughtful decision-making and safeguards 
individual liberty.87 Finally, Judge Kavanaugh determined that, compared to a 
multi-headed independent agency, the single-headed structure further reduced 
the President’s ability to exercise authority over the CFPB.88 Specifically he 
argued that, because the CFPB has a single director, the President may not se-
lect or remove a commissioner from the chair position, as he can with multi-
member commissions, thus denying the President influence over agency’s 
agenda.89 Moreover, unlike the staggered terms of multi-member commissions, 
which allow every President to exercise some authority through appointment, 
the CFPB provides a five-year term to one person, meaning that some Presi-
dents may be completely unable to exercise any influence through appoint-
ment.90 
While Judge Kavanaugh concluded in Section V of his dissent that the 
removal provision was severable, Judge Henderson disagreed, arguing that the 
                                                                                                                           
2 Pub. Papers 1471, 1472 (Aug. 15, 1994)). Furthermore, the Commissioner of the Social Security 
Administration cannot independently “bring law enforcement actions against private citizens, which is 
the core of the executive power, and the primary threat to individual liberty posed by the Executive 
Power.” Id. at 174–75 (citing Morrison, 487 U.S. at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). The Office of Special 
Counsel, which was enacted in 1978, suffered similar defects. Id. Judge Kavanaugh noted that the 
Office of Special Counsel was recently created and faced constitutional objections from the Executive 
Branch. Id. at 175. The original bill was objected to by President Carter’s Department of Justice. Id. 
(citing Memorandum Opinion for the General Counsel, Civil Service Commission: Presidential Ap-
pointees—Removal Power—Civil Service Reform Act—Constitutional Law (Article II, § 2, cl. 2), 2. 
Op. O.L.C. 120, 120 (May 26, 1978)). Additionally, President Reagan vetoed subsequent legislation 
regarding the office because of his belief that the agency’s independence was unconstitutional. Id. 
(citing President Ronald W. Reagan, Memorandum of Disapproval on a Bill Concerning Whistle-
blower Protection, 2 Pub. Papers 1391, 1392 (Oct. 26, 1988)). Judge Kavanaugh dismissed the single-
director Federal Housing Finance Agency as a comparable example because its creation in 2008 made 
it too contemporary to serve as a historical precedent. Id. at 175–76. Moreover, he noted that the 
Comptroller of the Currency did not qualify because the position did not have for-cause removal pro-
tection. Id. at 177 n.4 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)) (“The Comptroller of the Currency . . . shall hold 
his office for a term of five years unless sooner removed by the President, upon reasons to be commu-
nicated by him to the Senate.”). 
 87 Id. at 184–86. Judge Kavanaugh highlighted that varied perspectives push multi-membered 
commissions towards moderate and carefully considered decisions, an essential check on agency 
power. Id. at 184–85. Moreover, he favorably compared the multi-member commissions with the 
Framers’ decision to separate power between and within branches and compose the Supreme Court of 
multiple judges. Id. at 187. 
 88 Id. at 188. 
 89 Id. at 189–90 (noting that agency chairs typical control the agency’s budget, personnel, and 
agenda). 
 90 Id. at 190 (noting that a “new Director may be appointed in 2028. That Director could serve 
until 2033, meaning for the entirety of the term of the President elected in 2028,” assuming that Presi-
dent was elected to only one term). 
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removal provision was not severable.91 Instead, Judge Henderson argued that 
rendering the CFPB an executive agency by severing the removal provision 
would inappropriately eliminate agency independence.92 Moreover, it would 
alter the division of power between the executive and legislative branches, in-
creasing the President’s ability to influence the financial services industry 
while the legislative branches’ self-imposed limitations remained in place—a 
structure which Judge Henderson argued would not have passed in the 111th 
Congress.93 She concluded that these factors overcame the presumption of sev-
erability.94 The Southern District of New York adopted that portion of Judge 
Henderson’s PHH Corp. II dissent in RD Legal Funding, holding the CFPB 
wholly unconstitutional and unredeemable by severability.95 
III. JUDGE KAVANAUGH’S OPINION INAPPROPRIATELY SUPPLANTED THE 
COURT’S JUDGMENT FOR CONGRESS’S 
In establishing the CFPB, Congress recognized that inadequate consumer 
protections played an important role in precipitating the 2008 financial crisis.96 
Federal preemption and scattered enforcement authority allowed for the explo-
sion of abusive and unfair mortgage lending practices, which resulted in mil-
lions of home foreclosures and nearly $11 trillion in lost household wealth.97 
                                                                                                                           
 91 Id. at 200. Judge Kavanaugh employed the two-factor analysis used by the Supreme Court in 
Free Enterprise Fund, which looks to whether “(i) Congress would have preferred the law with the 
offending provision severed over no law at all; and (ii) the law with the offending provision severed 
would remain ‘full operative as a law.’” Id. at 199 (citing Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 509). He 
answered both question in the affirmative. Id. at 199–200. First, he concluded that Congress would 
have favored the severed law because the Dodd-Frank Act has an express severability clause. Id. at 
199; see 12 U.S.C. § 5302 (2012) (“If any provision of this Act . . . is held to be unconstitutional, the 
remainder of this Act . . . shall not be affected thereby.”). Secondly, severing the removal provision 
would not alter the CFPB’s ability to regulate and supervise financial service companies or its ability 
to enforce consumer financial services laws. PHH Corp. II, 881 F.3d at 199–200. Therefore, the 
Dodd-Frank Act and provisions tied to the CFPB would continue to be “fully operative as a law.” Id.; 
see Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 509 (determining that the two-tier removal protection was severable 
because eliminating the provision would not render the Sarbanes-Oxley Act inoperative). Justice Hen-
derson on the other hand argued, “[T]he presumption of severability is rebutted here. A severability 
clause ‘does not give the court power to amend’ a statute. Nor is it a license to cut out the ‘heart’ of a 
statute. Because Section 5491(c)(3) is at the heart of Title X [Dodd Frank], I would strike Title X in 
its entirety.” Id. at 163–64. Judge Henderson also pointed to the fact that Congress had sacrificed its 
own oversight powers over the CFPB as evidence that the provision was not severable. Id. at 162. 
 92 PHH Corp. II, 881 F.3d at 162. 
 93 Id. at 163. 
 94 Id. 
 95 RD Legal Funding, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 784 (citing PHH Corp. II, 881 F.3d at 163–64). 
 96 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 3, at 68–78 (documenting the role abusive and 
unfair lending practices in precipitating the financial crisis). 
 97 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 3, at xv (reporting the financial toll on American 
households caused by the 2008 financial crisis); Levitin, supra note 1, at 322–29 (highlighting scat-
tered federal enforcement responsibility and problems associated with growing federal preemption). 
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Congress sought to address those inadequacies by centering responsibility for 
the administration of consumer protection laws in the CFPB, delegating it au-
thority to respond to the fast-evolving financial services industry and prohibit 
any “unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice” relating to consumer finan-
cial products or services.98 To carry out that mission, Congress determined that 
a single director was more appropriate given the need for decisive action and 
prompt operation.99 Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent inappropriately supplanted the 
court’s judgment for Congress’s regarding the appropriate measure of agency 
accountability.100 
Judge Kavanaugh’s separation of powers analysis is untethered to Su-
preme Court precedent.101 His dissenting opinion places undue emphasis on 
Myers, which subsequent Supreme Court decisions reduced to the proposition 
that the legislature cannot give itself a role in removal decisions, and wrongly 
paints Humphrey’s Executor as an exception to a rule against removal re-
strictions.102 Viewing the limited array of removal power cases that have 
reached the Supreme Court as the outer range of permissible restrictions tre-
mendously limits Congress’s ability to respond to changed circumstance.103 
Moreover, Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion is overly reliant on the nebulous con-
cept of the agency’s impact on liberty.104 That approach fails to take into ac-
count that the separation of powers protects interests beyond liberty.105 Among 
                                                                                                                           
 98 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2012); see PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (PHH Corp. II), 
881 F.3d 75, 80–81 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (noting that in response to the financial crisis Congress integrat-
ed in the CFPB authority over consumer financial laws). 
 99 PHH Corp. II, 881 F.3d at 81 (indicating that appointing enough members to reach a quorum 
for a multi-member body would take more time, thus a single director would allow the CFPB to be 
fully operative quicker). 
 100 See Manning, supra note 76, at 47–48 (arguing that the Court overstepped its bounds in Free 
Enterprise Fund in determining that it was impermissible that removal power run through the SEC if 
Congress has the constitutional power to structure the President’s supervision of the executive 
branch). 
 101 See PHH Corp. II, 881 F.3d at 90 (majority opinion) (noting that Myers had not been revived 
by Humphrey’s Executor, Morrison, Wiener, or Free Enterprise Fund, and was cited to “only for 
general restatements of the law, all of which are consistent with Morrison”). 
 102 See id. at 164 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“In 1935, however, the Supreme carved out an 
exception to Myers . . . .”). 
 103 Id. at 77–78 (majority opinion). 
 104 Id. at 105, 164, 166. Judge Kavanaugh’s opening line, “[t]his is a case about individual liberty 
and executive power” is instructive. Id. at 164 (Kavanugh, J., dissenting). The majority conversely 
noted that determining the constitutionality of the CFPB’s removal provision on the basis of its impact 
on liberty not only deviates from precedent but requires two additional assumptions. Id. at 105 (major-
ity opinion). First, it assumes that measuring the constitutionality of a provision based on one of the 
broader goals of the separation of powers is a judicially manageable goal when in fact any number of 
conclusions could be fairly drawn based on how one perceived liberty. Id. Second, it assumes that the 
CFPB actually inhibits liberty. Id. at 106. 
 105 Manning, supra note 76, at 56–57 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 334 
U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)) (“While the Constitution diffuses power the better to 
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those conflicting interests are “efficiency, energy, stability, limited government, 
control of factions, deliberation, the rule of law, and accountability.”106 An 
analysis confined solely to the agency's impact on liberty fails to give proper 
accord to these numerous other interests.107 
Moreover, Judge Kavanaugh’s reliance on the CFPB’s novelty is inappro-
priate.108 While anti-novelty analyses are certainly in vogue, they should not be 
used to prove unconstitutionality because doing so improperly assumes that the 
legislative branch has previously exercised the full extent of its power, when in 
fact there may be many reasons why Congress elected not to exercise its full 
power until recently.109 Such an analysis unnecessarily limits legislative choic-
es and fails to allow the political branches to respond to changed circumstanc-
es.110 Instead, separation of powers cases regarding the removal power ought 
to be decided with a greater degree of deference to the political branches.111 
The PHH Corp. II majority’s analysis, which looks to the means and necessity 
of the agency’s independence to determine whether the President’s ability to 
faithfully execute the law has been unconstitutionally impinged, provides such 
deference.112 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Kavanaugh and Judge Henderson’s dissents in Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau v. PHH Corp. (“PHH Corp. II”), which were adopted by the 
                                                                                                                           
secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable 
government.”). 
 106 Id. at 57. 
 107 See id. at 56–57 (noting that “the purposes of the separation of powers are too general and 
diverse to offer much concrete guidance ‘about the extent to which’ Congress may structure the exer-
cise of the allocated powers.”). 
 108 See Leah M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 DUKE L.J. 1407, 1412 (2017). The proposi-
tion that a lack of historical precedent indicates a “severe constitutional problem” has its roots in the 
Court’s monumental decision, McCulloch v. Maryland. Id. at 1411 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819)). Notably the author of that decision, Chief Justice John Marshall, was 
not looking for the absence of historical practice to show the legislature’s action was unconstitutional. Id. 
Instead he believed that evidence of historical practice suggested that the practice was constitutional—or 
as modern scholars Professor Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison have explained, whether the other 
branch has “acquiesced” to the practice by failing to challenge it. Id. Still, in the 1990s the Court began to 
apply the inverse, that novelty indicates unconstitutionality, eventually using the analysis in cases regard-
ing the separation of powers. Id. at 1415–18. 
 109 Id. at 1415–21 (highlighting the growing use of novelty in Supreme Court and Federal Circuit 
decisions, including PHH Corp. II). 
 110 Id. at 1427–29 (arguing that novelty should not serve as evidence of unconstitutionality be-
cause the multitude of barriers that inhibit and problematize the enactment of laws push back against 
such assumptions). 
 111 Manning, supra note 76, at 4–5. 
 112 See PHH Corp. II, 881 F.3d at 78 (determining that the permissibility of a for-cause removal 
provision depends on whether the method Congress used to render the agency independent is permis-
sible and whether the agency requires that measure of independence). 
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United States Southern District Court of New York in Consumber Financial 
Protection Bureau v. RD Legal Funding, invalidated the CFPB on the ground 
that a single-headed independent agency with for-cause removal protection 
runs afoul of the Constitution’s separation of powers. Rather than analyzing 
the structure using the Morrison v. Olson test, the PHH Corp. II dissenters re-
lied on nebulous notions of liberty and novelty in determining that a single-
headed agency with for-cause removal protections was unconstitutional. That 
analysis inappropriately substituted the judgment of the court for Congress's by 
placing undue emphasis on Myers v. United States, the novelty of the CFPB's 
structure, and failing to consider the numerous interests other than liberty that 
the separation of powers protects. 
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